

Supplemental Appendix for:
Pressed to Prolong: Conscription, the Costs of Military
Labor, and Civil War Duration

Noel Anderson,^{*} Benjamin E. Bagozzi,[†] and Ore Koren[‡]

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^{*}Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. Email: noel.anderson@utoronto.ca.

[†]Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Delaware. Email: bagozzib@udel.edu.

[‡]Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington. Email: okoren@iu.edu.

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Table A.1: Summary Statistics

	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Conscription	1.000	0.552	0.497	0.000	1.000
Territorial control	0.000	0.378	0.485	0.000	1.000
Strong central command	0.000	0.168	0.374	0.000	1.000
High mobilization capacity	0.000	0.075	0.264	0.000	1.000
High arms-procurement capacity	0.000	0.006	0.076	0.000	1.000
High fighting capacity	0.000	0.012	0.107	0.000	1.000
Rebels stronger	0.000	0.023	0.149	0.000	1.000
Rebels at parity	0.000	0.059	0.236	0.000	1.000
Legal political wing	0.000	0.112	0.316	0.000	1.000
War on core territory	1.000	0.936	0.245	0.000	1.000
Coup d'etat	0.000	0.022	0.146	0.000	1.000
ELF index	0.526	0.561	0.238	0.004	1.000
Ethnic conflict	0.000	0.337	0.473	0.000	1.000
Ln GDP per capita	7.662	7.629	1.018	5.597	10.469
Democracy	0.000	0.323	0.468	0.000	1.000
Two or more dyads	0.000	0.486	0.500	0.000	1.000
Ln population	10.053	10.079	1.472	5.342	13.883
Prior conflicts	1.000	2.486	2.920	0.000	14.000
International conflict	0.000	0.075	0.263	0.000	1.000
Military exp./gdp	1.425	3.176	4.744	0.000	50.285
Rivalry	0.000	0.395	0.489	0.000	1.000
Polity	0.000	0.043	6.968	-10.000	10.000
Energy per cap.	0.548	1.339	2.086	0.000	18.913
Competitive intervention	0.000	0.349	0.477	0.000	1.000
GDP Growth	4.123	3.136	7.664	-64.047	57.818
Ln military personnel	4.718	4.697	1.461	0.000	8.666
Prior dyadic conflict	0.000	0.224	.417	0.000	1.000
Ln mil. exp/mil. pers	8.371	8.344	1.290	-3.932	12.415
Mil. pers/(pop/1000)	4.558	8.153	10.567	0.000	76.889
Political corruption	0.654	0.599	0.257	0.021	0.969
Anti-colonial conflict	0.000	0.061	0.239	0.000	1.000
Autonomy conflict	0.000	0.047	0.213	0.000	1.000
Independence conflict	0.000	0.009	0.093	0.000	1.000
Civil war conflict	0.000	0.474	0.499	0.000	1.000
Secessionist conflict	0.000	0.252	0.434	0.000	1.000
Ethnic conflict (explicit)	0.000	0.050	0.218	0.000	1.000
Communist conflict	0.000	0.092	0.289	0.000	1.000
Terrorist conflict	0.000	0.067	0.250	0.000	1.000
Ln Time	7.005	7.287	1.668	0.000	9.538
Ln $\sqrt{\text{Time}}$	3.503	3.643	0.834	0.000	4.769
$\sqrt{\text{Time}}$	41.881	38.223	23.438	1.000	117.809
Time	1461	2303.167	2378.807	1.000	13879

Table A.2: Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics (Schoenfeld Residuals Tests)

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	ρ	χ^2	p-value	ρ	χ^2	p-value	ρ	χ^2	p-value
Conscription	-0.118	9.82	0.002	-0.117	11.36	0.001	-0.136	14.61	0.000
Territorial control	0.068	2.31	0.128	0.028	0.42	0.519	0.049	1.23	0.268
Strong central command	0.006	0.02	0.878	.	.	.	0.003	0.01	0.941
High mobilization capacity	-0.039	0.70	0.404	.	.	.	-0.053	1.21	0.271
High arms-procurement capacity	0.032	0.62	0.432	.	.	.	0.059	1.64	0.201
High fighting capacity	0.087	3.52	0.061	.	.	.	0.094	5.60	0.018
Rebels stronger	.	.	.	0.031	0.51	0.473	-0.059	2.32	0.127
Rebels at parity	.	.	.	0.088	2.67	0.102	0.072	1.87	0.172
Legal political wing	0.015	0.16	0.691	0.029	0.52	0.472	0.019	0.22	0.635
War on core territory	-0.039	0.78	0.378	-0.061	1.88	0.171	-0.063	1.99	0.158
Coup d'etat	-0.141	16.92	0.000	-0.114	10.57	0.001	-0.131	13.43	0.000
ELF index	0.003	0.01	0.942	0.015	0.13	0.719	0.021	0.26	0.613
Ethnic conflict	-0.122	11.26	0.001	-0.108	8.42	0.004	-0.123	11.11	0.001
Ln GDP per capita	0.005	0.02	0.899	0.007	0.03	0.871	0.017	0.15	0.694
Democracy	-0.006	0.02	0.893	-0.044	1.20	0.274	-0.029	0.51	0.476
Two or more dyads	0.100	4.01	0.045	0.116	5.77	0.016	0.122	6.65	0.010
Ln population	0.061	3.00	0.083	0.068	3.59	0.058	0.056	2.47	0.116
Past conflicts	0.002	0.00	0.973
Global test	.	46.85	0.00	.	44.22	0.000	.	50.76	0.001

Note: All χ^2 statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for *Global test* whose degrees of freedom are 15, 13, 18 for Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

Table A.3: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Democracy Cases Only

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.768 (0.597)	-0.655 (0.585)	-1.016 (0.668)	2.374* (1.363)	1.546 (1.566)	1.239 (1.779)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.569*** (0.178)	-0.513** (0.206)	-0.492** (0.225)
Territorial control	-1.157*** (0.291)	-1.332*** (0.332)	-1.351*** (0.330)	-1.677*** (0.350)	-1.800*** (0.359)	-1.867*** (0.374)
Strong central command	-0.000488 (0.436)	.	-0.0171 (0.423)	0.280 (0.486)	.	0.602 (0.467)
High mobilization capacity	0.366 (0.291)	.	0.190 (0.296)	0.756** (0.359)	.	0.419 (0.324)
Legal political wing	0.812** (0.317)	0.854*** (0.327)	0.792** (0.321)	0.563 (0.351)	0.890** (0.380)	0.828** (0.374)
War on core territory	-2.291*** (0.604)	-2.614*** (0.623)	-2.756*** (0.631)	-2.902*** (0.685)	-2.273*** (0.674)	-2.462*** (0.694)
Coup d'etat	2.192*** (0.783)	2.548*** (0.749)	2.507*** (0.753)	9.538*** (2.627)	.	.
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-1.117*** (0.328)	.	.
ELF index	1.155* (0.638)	1.304* (0.754)	1.638** (0.769)	2.462*** (0.892)	1.918* (1.144)	2.515** (1.135)
Ethnic Conflict	0.676 (0.648)	0.893 (0.663)	1.015* (0.610)	10.11*** (2.430)	4.336*** (1.676)	4.736*** (1.794)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-1.430*** (0.307)	-0.712*** (0.221)	-0.771*** (0.238)
Ln GDP per capita	0.0682 (0.209)	0.0438 (0.224)	0.186 (0.245)	0.0814 (0.200)	0.145 (0.188)	0.156 (0.222)
Two or more dyads	-1.042** (0.405)	-0.979** (0.423)	-0.953** (0.414)	3.322 (2.262)	0.536 (1.895)	1.124 (1.878)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.628** (0.299)	-0.294 (0.251)	-0.360 (0.248)
Ln population	-0.383*** (0.0937)	-0.393*** (0.0961)	-0.332*** (0.108)	-0.491*** (0.0923)	-0.566*** (0.119)	-0.516*** (0.134)
Rebels stronger	.	3.775*** (0.680)	3.613*** (0.654)	.	3.497*** (0.910)	3.108*** (0.981)
Rebels at parity	.	-0.0510 (0.593)	-0.429 (0.714)	.	-0.174 (1.008)	-0.347 (1.035)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.102 (0.0655)	.	.	-0.0713 (0.0740)
Observations	784	784	784	784	784	784

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Autocracy Cases Only

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.434** (0.180)	-0.434** (0.192)	-0.488*** (0.189)	1.864*** (0.558)	1.836*** (0.597)	1.899*** (0.564)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.377*** (0.0838)	-0.377*** (0.0882)	-0.391*** (0.0847)
Territorial control	-0.280* (0.155)	-0.354** (0.164)	-0.402** (0.166)	-0.257 (0.158)	-0.326* (0.168)	-0.376** (0.170)
Strong central command	0.257 (0.173)	.	0.242 (0.173)	0.231 (0.169)	.	0.198 (0.175)
High mobilization capacity	0.190 (0.228)	.	0.175 (0.220)	0.0824 (0.208)	.	0.0763 (0.206)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.369 (0.503)	.	0.396 (0.454)	0.687 (0.539)	.	0.751 (0.503)
High Fighting Capacity	0.505 (0.329)	.	0.339 (0.411)	-1.023* (0.600)	.	-1.240** (0.581)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.294*** (0.0867)	.	0.317*** (0.0870)
Legal political wing	0.583** (0.230)	0.562** (0.226)	0.599*** (0.227)	0.497** (0.217)	0.463** (0.212)	0.516** (0.212)
War on core territory	0.120 (0.313)	0.0446 (0.313)	0.0650 (0.312)	-0.143 (0.321)	-0.186 (0.322)	-0.207 (0.319)
Coup d'etat	2.072*** (0.386)	2.190*** (0.365)	2.082*** (0.374)	4.936*** (1.031)	4.602*** (1.026)	4.901*** (1.006)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.711*** (0.169)	-0.618*** (0.168)	-0.716*** (0.167)
ELF index	0.134 (0.352)	0.0954 (0.347)	0.116 (0.355)	0.464 (0.369)	0.438 (0.375)	0.455 (0.373)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.261 (0.200)	-0.198 (0.194)	-0.209 (0.199)	4.061*** (0.963)	4.025*** (0.952)	3.993*** (0.950)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.654*** (0.136)	-0.642*** (0.135)	-0.637*** (0.136)
Ln GDP per capita	0.171* (0.0949)	0.202** (0.0956)	0.191** (0.0969)	0.191** (0.0946)	0.212** (0.0975)	0.211** (0.0975)
Two or more dyads	-0.281** (0.131)	-0.238* (0.137)	-0.230* (0.136)	0.251 (0.595)	0.147 (0.588)	0.258 (0.595)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.0766 (0.0863)	-0.0559 (0.0846)	-0.0697 (0.0860)
Ln population	0.0115 (0.0651)	0.0537 (0.0661)	0.0419 (0.0721)	0.00651 (0.0630)	0.0249 (0.0632)	0.0393 (0.0737)
Rebels stronger	.	0.725*** (0.271)	0.262 (0.366)	.	0.267 (0.281)	0.163 (0.413)
Rebels at parity	.	0.675*** (0.192)	0.629*** (0.193)	.	0.599*** (0.200)	0.624*** (0.205)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.00590 (0.0369)	.	.	-0.0104 (0.0382)
Observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Excluding Israel

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.377** (0.165)	-0.347** (0.172)	-0.412** (0.171)	1.896*** (0.481)	1.861*** (0.517)	1.928*** (0.486)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.383*** (0.0712)	-0.380*** (0.0753)	-0.394*** (0.0713)
Territorial control	-0.380*** (0.145)	-0.455*** (0.155)	-0.499*** (0.152)	-0.391*** (0.148)	-0.436*** (0.159)	-0.506*** (0.159)
Strong central command	0.243 (0.162)	.	0.250 (0.158)	0.283* (0.157)	.	0.279* (0.160)
High mobilization capacity	0.249 (0.185)	.	0.214 (0.181)	0.208 (0.171)	.	0.186 (0.169)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.430 (0.454)	.	0.375 (0.415)	0.605 (0.520)	.	0.576 (0.489)
High Fighting Capacity	0.443 (0.321)	.	0.109 (0.415)	-1.066* (0.573)	.	-1.385** (0.575)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.268*** (0.0822)	.	0.279*** (0.0835)
Legal political wing	0.530*** (0.191)	0.505*** (0.191)	0.536*** (0.189)	0.464** (0.184)	0.425** (0.183)	0.468** (0.182)
War on core territory	-0.497* (0.288)	-0.549* (0.281)	-0.553* (0.297)	-0.618** (0.269)	-0.621** (0.267)	-0.653** (0.272)
Coup d'etat	2.008*** (0.328)	2.078*** (0.313)	2.005*** (0.317)	5.379*** (0.970)	5.003*** (0.962)	5.307*** (0.947)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.730*** (0.158)	-0.653*** (0.157)	-0.727*** (0.155)
ELF index	0.357 (0.306)	0.277 (0.300)	0.320 (0.307)	0.546* (0.316)	0.477 (0.314)	0.498 (0.320)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.0927 (0.183)	-0.0393 (0.179)	-0.0316 (0.182)	4.860*** (0.881)	4.797*** (0.859)	4.783*** (0.870)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.751*** (0.124)	-0.738*** (0.122)	-0.734*** (0.124)
Ln GDP per capita	0.163* (0.0857)	0.180** (0.0834)	0.163* (0.0873)	0.183** (0.0849)	0.209** (0.0841)	0.184** (0.0873)
Democracy	-0.691*** (0.190)	-0.716*** (0.196)	-0.724*** (0.197)	-0.602*** (0.178)	-0.618*** (0.184)	-0.632*** (0.189)
Two or more dyads	-0.429*** (0.125)	-0.414*** (0.129)	-0.398*** (0.129)	0.649 (0.578)	0.479 (0.567)	0.636 (0.582)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.157* (0.0842)	-0.129 (0.0825)	-0.150* (0.0845)
Ln population	-0.0965* (0.0554)	-0.0674 (0.0552)	-0.0529 (0.0629)	-0.120** (0.0545)	-0.109** (0.0548)	-0.0770 (0.0658)
Rebels stronger	.	0.804*** (0.253)	0.478 (0.363)	.	0.296 (0.272)	0.361 (0.430)
Rebels at parity	.	0.613*** (0.182)	0.565*** (0.180)	.	0.520*** (0.194)	0.546*** (0.196)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0271 (0.0315)	.	.	-0.0256 (0.0322)
Observations	2,289	2,289	2,289	2,289	2,289	2,289

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Using Efron's Method for Handling Ties

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.411** (0.168)	-0.369** (0.179)	-0.442** (0.177)	1.928*** (0.533)	1.950*** (0.565)	1.967*** (0.535)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.393*** (0.0779)	-0.398*** (0.0815)	-0.405*** (0.0777)
Territorial control	-0.390*** (0.145)	-0.463*** (0.155)	-0.517*** (0.153)	-0.391*** (0.148)	-0.440*** (0.159)	-0.515*** (0.161)
Strong central command	0.281* (0.166)	.	0.289* (0.162)	0.318** (0.161)	.	0.314* (0.165)
High mobilization capacity	0.287 (0.190)	.	0.248 (0.186)	0.223 (0.175)	.	0.195 (0.173)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.460 (0.515)	.	0.378 (0.480)	0.642 (0.521)	.	0.595 (0.490)
High Fighting Capacity	0.576* (0.346)	.	0.179 (0.433)	-0.825 (0.595)	.	-1.202** (0.603)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.228*** (0.0868)	.	0.239*** (0.0882)
Legal political wing	0.582*** (0.194)	0.549*** (0.195)	0.581*** (0.192)	0.486*** (0.186)	0.449** (0.184)	0.487*** (0.184)
War on core territory	-0.595** (0.292)	-0.657** (0.286)	-0.656** (0.300)	-0.710*** (0.272)	-0.724*** (0.270)	-0.747*** (0.275)
Coup d'etat	2.135*** (0.348)	2.215*** (0.332)	2.135*** (0.334)	5.951*** (1.021)	5.611*** (1.001)	5.877*** (0.994)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.844*** (0.169)	-0.773*** (0.166)	-0.843*** (0.166)
ELF index	0.341 (0.312)	0.248 (0.308)	0.310 (0.310)	0.537* (0.318)	0.454 (0.314)	0.490 (0.321)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.0983 (0.186)	-0.0369 (0.180)	-0.0329 (0.185)	5.065*** (0.894)	4.968*** (0.871)	4.981*** (0.882)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.783*** (0.126)	-0.763*** (0.123)	-0.764*** (0.125)
Ln GDP per capita	0.136 (0.0846)	0.151* (0.0835)	0.135 (0.0866)	0.161* (0.0839)	0.185** (0.0841)	0.162* (0.0864)
Democracy	-0.840*** (0.197)	-0.870*** (0.205)	-0.866*** (0.202)	-0.729*** (0.190)	-0.763*** (0.198)	-0.755*** (0.198)
Two or more dyads	-0.447*** (0.124)	-0.435*** (0.128)	-0.415*** (0.128)	0.468 (0.584)	0.322 (0.571)	0.449 (0.587)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.134 (0.0844)	-0.110 (0.0825)	-0.126 (0.0847)
Ln population	-0.0656 (0.0565)	-0.0326 (0.0565)	-0.0200 (0.0631)	-0.0890 (0.0560)	-0.0706 (0.0564)	-0.0421 (0.0665)
Rebels stronger	.	0.961*** (0.279)	0.574 (0.378)	.	0.447 (0.279)	0.437 (0.441)
Rebels at parity	.	0.646*** (0.192)	0.591*** (0.187)	.	0.572*** (0.195)	0.568*** (0.199)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0287 (0.0311)	.	.	-0.0295 (0.0321)
Observations	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Omitting Post-Conflict Conscription Adopters

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.314*	-0.307*	-0.311*	1.892***	1.861***	1.919***
	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.182)	(0.470)	(0.501)	(0.476)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.387***	-0.387***	-0.390***
				(0.0708)	(0.0747)	(0.0712)
Territorial control	-0.264*	-0.303*	-0.352**	-0.297*	-0.308*	-0.381**
	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.168)	(0.170)
Strong central command	0.404**	.	0.402**	0.400**	.	0.396**
	(0.157)		(0.158)	(0.157)		(0.163)
High mobilization capacity	0.232	.	0.220	0.185	.	0.182
	(0.196)		(0.191)	(0.179)		(0.174)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.513	.	0.422	0.619	.	0.586
	(0.425)		(0.402)	(0.489)		(0.470)
High Fighting Capacity	0.212	.	-0.0882	-1.118**	.	-1.372**
	(0.327)		(0.411)	(0.547)		(0.564)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.235***	.	0.246***
				(0.0817)		(0.0830)
Legal political wing	0.518***	0.517***	0.532***	0.459**	0.434**	0.479***
	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.179)
War on core territory	-0.596**	-0.612**	-0.609**	-0.718**	-0.699**	-0.712**
	(0.303)	(0.297)	(0.304)	(0.283)	(0.282)	(0.278)
Coup d'etat	1.975***	2.045***	1.991***	5.442***	5.137***	5.440***
	(0.352)	(0.337)	(0.340)	(0.994)	(0.996)	(0.986)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.750***	-0.688***	-0.753***
				(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.161)
ELF index	0.168	0.105	0.115	0.390	0.323	0.308
	(0.299)	(0.302)	(0.297)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.317)
Ethnic Conflict	0.0773	0.107	0.0919	4.986***	4.898***	4.976***
	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.897)	(0.889)	(0.890)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.765***	-0.750***	-0.765***
				(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Ln GDP per capita	-0.0289	0.0246	-0.0224	0.0250	0.0715	0.0312
	(0.0849)	(0.0855)	(0.0887)	(0.0785)	(0.0788)	(0.0819)
Democracy	-0.833***	-0.868***	-0.837***	-0.723***	-0.758***	-0.722***
	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.199)
Two or more dyads	-0.556***	-0.551***	-0.537***	0.755	0.545	0.793
	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.597)	(0.588)	(0.590)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.194**	-0.162*	-0.197**
				(0.0863)	(0.0853)	(0.0849)
Ln population	-0.0736	-0.0516	-0.0635	-0.103*	-0.0931*	-0.102
	(0.0535)	(0.0541)	(0.0619)	(0.0529)	(0.0537)	(0.0654)
Rebels stronger	.	0.731***	0.455	.	0.203	0.285
		(0.249)	(0.341)		(0.261)	(0.410)
Rebels at parity	.	0.437**	0.399**	.	0.378*	0.409*
		(0.194)	(0.192)		(0.208)	(0.218)
Prior conflicts	.	.	0.00528	.	.	0.0152
			(0.0323)			(0.0323)
Observations	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009	2,009

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Controlling for Additional Correlates

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.854*** (0.296)	-0.927*** (0.334)	-1.016*** (0.345)	1.903*** (0.587)	1.310*** (0.502)	2.038*** (0.620)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.476*** (0.0883)	-0.399*** (0.0711)	-0.523*** (0.0928)
Territorial control	-0.460** (0.233)	-0.619*** (0.224)	-0.630*** (0.229)	-0.552** (0.247)	-0.659*** (0.233)	-0.749*** (0.242)
Strong central command	0.137 (0.246)	.	0.104 (0.243)	0.132 (0.251)	.	0.0670 (0.253)
High mobilization capacity	-0.172 (0.315)	.	-0.172 (0.265)	-0.00415 (0.321)	.	-0.0211 (0.284)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.203 (0.696)	.	0.271 (0.509)	0.520 (0.837)	.	0.490 (0.837)
High Fighting Capacity	0.746* (0.435)	.	0.612 (0.853)	-1.202 (0.811)	.	-2.382** (0.958)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.342** (0.155)	.	0.396** (0.187)
Legal political wing	0.630** (0.250)	0.652*** (0.232)	0.653*** (0.240)	0.693*** (0.248)	0.654*** (0.234)	0.696*** (0.226)
War on core territory	-2.060*** (0.709)	-1.893*** (0.703)	-2.230*** (0.763)	-2.195*** (0.756)	-2.008*** (0.724)	-2.545*** (0.813)
Coup d'etat	2.088*** (0.390)	2.198*** (0.373)	2.056*** (0.391)	4.155*** (0.923)	3.566*** (0.913)	4.312*** (0.861)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.409*** (0.145)	-0.299** (0.147)	-0.425*** (0.141)
ELF index	0.511 (0.474)	0.466 (0.439)	0.477 (0.462)	0.758 (0.533)	0.712 (0.482)	0.755 (0.512)
Ethnic Conflict	0.0266 (0.269)	0.0195 (0.269)	0.0819 (0.267)	3.709*** (0.971)	3.781*** (0.949)	4.021*** (0.942)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.551*** (0.133)	-0.563*** (0.129)	-0.585*** (0.129)
Ln GDP per capita	0.0716 (0.224)	0.126 (0.222)	0.0847 (0.238)	0.243 (0.235)	0.188 (0.232)	0.240 (0.247)
Democracy	-0.816* (0.437)	-0.884** (0.438)	-0.798* (0.437)	-0.829* (0.452)	-0.656 (0.448)	-0.872* (0.460)
Two or more dyads	-0.523** (0.219)	-0.491** (0.224)	-0.475** (0.224)	-1.304 (1.226)	-1.334 (1.229)	-1.263 (1.204)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	0.126 (0.174)	0.131 (0.175)	0.133 (0.170)
Ln population	-0.209 (0.231)	-0.247 (0.238)	-0.230 (0.240)	-0.334 (0.241)	-0.337 (0.241)	-0.355 (0.255)
International conflict	0.310 (0.350)	0.214 (0.331)	0.206 (0.350)	0.223 (0.359)	0.306 (0.342)	0.0636 (0.362)
Military exp./gdp	-0.0393 (0.0590)	-0.0340 (0.0593)	-0.0291 (0.0594)	-0.0499 (0.0498)	-0.0513 (0.0526)	-0.0381 (0.0486)
Rivalry	0.273 (0.236)	0.321 (0.239)	0.334 (0.241)	0.409 (0.253)	0.381 (0.259)	0.493* (0.256)
Polity	-0.00242 (0.0295)	-0.00482 (0.0294)	-0.0103 (0.0296)	-0.00228 (0.0309)	-0.0210 (0.0304)	-0.00887 (0.0318)
Energy per cap.	0.117** (0.0512)	0.125** (0.0537)	0.130** (0.0537)	0.00659 (0.0526)	0.0655 (0.0466)	0.0103 (0.0545)
Competitive intervention	-0.382* (0.231)	-0.437* (0.226)	-0.521** (0.228)	-0.562** (0.227)	-0.525** (0.221)	-0.742*** (0.221)
GDP growth	0.00499 (0.0124)	0.00449 (0.0119)	0.00559 (0.0121)	0.00785 (0.0108)	0.00602 (0.0109)	0.0107 (0.0103)
Ln military personnel	-0.00291 (0.243)	0.0687 (0.253)	0.103 (0.266)	0.0914 (0.239)	0.0902 (0.238)	0.231 (0.265)
Prior dyadic conflict	-0.303 (0.240)	-0.251 (0.245)	-0.205 (0.251)	-0.280 (0.244)	-0.222 (0.247)	-0.145 (0.248)
Ln mil. exp/mil. pers	0.0630 (0.137)	0.0278 (0.135)	0.0448 (0.141)	0.183 (0.148)	0.166 (0.150)	0.191 (0.151)
Mil. pers/(pop/1000)	0.00469 (0.0302)	0.000842 (0.0309)	0.000359 (0.0315)	0.00926 (0.0270)	0.00582 (0.0283)	0.00470 (0.0276)
Political corruption	0.762 (0.474)	0.672 (0.447)	0.790* (0.451)	0.968** (0.468)	0.723 (0.486)	1.072** (0.469)
Rebels stronger	.	0.792** (0.313)	0.105 (0.887)	.	0.246 (0.464)	0.998 (0.890)
Rebels at parity	.	1.179*** (0.281)	1.077*** (0.315)	.	0.976*** (0.336)	1.281*** (0.324)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0657 (0.0630)	.	.	-0.0901 (0.0608)
Observations	1,434	1,434	1,434	1,434	1,434	1,434

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Controlling for Forced Rebel Recruitment

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.628** (0.312)	-0.568** (0.276)	-0.648** (0.308)	6.017*** (1.514)	6.105*** (1.523)	6.160*** (1.545)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.944*** (0.211)	-0.957*** (0.213)	-0.963*** (0.216)
Territorial control	-0.742*** (0.223)	-1.069*** (0.260)	-1.019*** (0.269)	-0.873*** (0.222)	-1.195*** (0.247)	-1.161*** (0.259)
Strong central command	0.0278 (0.260)	.	0.0255 (0.284)	-0.00936 (0.257)	.	-0.0510 (0.286)
High mobilization capacity	0.249 (0.366)	.	0.289 (0.444)	0.408 (0.335)	.	0.557 (0.385)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.765 (2.059)	.	0.706 (1.935)	0.843 (2.551)	.	0.567 (2.341)
High Fighting Capacity	0.769 (1.229)	.	0.534 (1.552)	-12.75 (18.54)	.	-12.18 (17.25)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	2.310 (2.864)	.	2.215 (2.648)
Legal political wing	0.972*** (0.312)	1.146*** (0.304)	1.133*** (0.310)	0.871*** (0.291)	1.019*** (0.290)	0.988*** (0.288)
Coup d'etat	3.547*** (0.585)	3.303*** (0.401)	3.431*** (0.417)	3.479*** (1.021)	3.508*** (1.005)	3.571*** (1.003)
ELF index	0.340 (0.458)	0.0954 (0.499)	0.0881 (0.485)	1.127** (0.518)	0.772 (0.573)	0.719 (0.580)
Ethnic Conflict	0.437* (0.261)	0.536** (0.257)	0.485* (0.281)	7.795*** (1.433)	7.604*** (1.306)	7.925*** (1.489)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-1.009*** (0.194)	-0.977*** (0.182)	-1.034*** (0.209)
Ln GDP per capita	-0.185 (0.166)	-0.235* (0.138)	-0.182 (0.163)	-0.189 (0.148)	-0.199 (0.134)	-0.189 (0.153)
Democracy	-1.261*** (0.361)	-1.442*** (0.341)	-1.462*** (0.384)	-0.989*** (0.304)	-1.217*** (0.336)	-1.149*** (0.356)
Two or more dyads	0.0492 (0.187)	0.163 (0.184)	0.196 (0.189)	1.131 (1.760)	0.669 (1.566)	1.079 (1.700)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.149 (0.237)	-0.0688 (0.215)	-0.120 (0.234)
Ln population	-0.269** (0.105)	-0.255*** (0.0928)	-0.271** (0.111)	-0.369*** (0.0980)	-0.340*** (0.0948)	-0.424*** (0.114)
Forced rebel recruitment	-0.456** (0.230)	-0.598*** (0.227)	-0.543** (0.225)	-0.273 (0.266)	-0.397 (0.259)	-0.420 (0.272)
Rebels stronger	.	0.942** (0.370)	0.450 (0.626)	.	0.829** (0.346)	0.191 (0.535)
Rebels at parity	.	1.421*** (0.308)	1.442*** (0.304)	.	1.409*** (0.407)	1.487*** (0.414)
Prior conflicts	.	.	0.0215 (0.0429)	.	.	0.0608 (0.0426)
Observations	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Controlling for Civil War Types

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.450*** (0.169)	-0.417** (0.177)	-0.482*** (0.174)	1.842*** (0.471)	1.828*** (0.515)	1.884*** (0.475)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.387*** (0.0696)	-0.387*** (0.0747)	-0.397*** (0.0701)
Territorial control	-0.347** (0.148)	-0.405** (0.160)	-0.469*** (0.157)	-0.341** (0.151)	-0.368** (0.164)	-0.464*** (0.163)
Strong central command	0.320* (0.171)	.	0.329* (0.169)	0.361** (0.169)	.	0.358** (0.174)
High mobilization capacity	0.299 (0.185)	.	0.261 (0.178)	0.257 (0.179)	.	0.228 (0.175)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.458 (0.482)	.	0.426 (0.431)	0.616 (0.536)	.	0.598 (0.494)
High Fighting Capacity	0.348 (0.350)	.	0.0692 (0.431)	-1.140** (0.581)	.	-1.465** (0.572)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.270*** (0.0828)	.	0.284*** (0.0834)
Legal political wing	0.519** (0.202)	0.492** (0.203)	0.521*** (0.198)	0.442** (0.185)	0.407** (0.185)	0.447** (0.181)
War on core territory	-2.467*** (0.694)	-2.298*** (0.654)	-2.447*** (0.684)	-1.463*** (0.532)	-1.302** (0.539)	-1.418** (0.551)
Coup d'etat	1.688*** (0.479)	1.838*** (0.455)	1.666*** (0.473)	4.995*** (0.991)	4.737*** (0.979)	4.930*** (0.982)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.742*** (0.159)	-0.663*** (0.158)	-0.740*** (0.156)
ELF index	0.305 (0.347)	0.194 (0.348)	0.231 (0.351)	0.445 (0.354)	0.355 (0.361)	0.365 (0.364)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.489 (0.738)	-0.415 (0.813)	-0.464 (0.767)	4.111*** (1.057)	4.104*** (1.088)	4.048*** (1.076)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.735*** (0.127)	-0.721*** (0.124)	-0.723*** (0.126)
Ln GDP per capita	0.173* (0.0947)	0.188** (0.0934)	0.165* (0.0972)	0.156* (0.0923)	0.182* (0.0939)	0.150 (0.0956)
Democracy	-0.781*** (0.199)	-0.818*** (0.206)	-0.800*** (0.207)	-0.659*** (0.183)	-0.688*** (0.193)	-0.672*** (0.196)
Two or more dyads	-0.400*** (0.132)	-0.388*** (0.133)	-0.374*** (0.134)	0.676 (0.586)	0.443 (0.574)	0.668 (0.587)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.160* (0.0837)	-0.123 (0.0820)	-0.154* (0.0839)
Ln population	-0.0809 (0.0626)	-0.0432 (0.0627)	-0.0368 (0.0720)	-0.0917 (0.0612)	-0.0690 (0.0620)	-0.0511 (0.0758)
Anti-colonial conflict	-2.460*** (0.766)	-2.161*** (0.720)	-2.414*** (0.754)	-1.389** (0.641)	-1.077* (0.637)	-1.314** (0.656)
Autonomy conflict	-0.270 (0.720)	-0.239 (0.802)	-0.194 (0.749)	0.127 (0.676)	0.153 (0.741)	0.203 (0.711)
Independence conflict	0.170 (0.460)	0.0691 (0.454)	0.0551 (0.479)	0.310 (0.455)	0.291 (0.455)	0.215 (0.484)
Civil war conflict	-0.395 (0.369)	-0.307 (0.361)	-0.398 (0.368)	-0.493 (0.315)	-0.349 (0.317)	-0.485 (0.320)
Secessionist conflict	-0.0321 (0.618)	0.0316 (0.702)	-0.0307 (0.653)	0.0371 (0.596)	0.113 (0.665)	0.0519 (0.631)
Ethnic conflict	0.642 (0.724)	0.534 (0.806)	0.594 (0.759)	0.644 (0.647)	0.568 (0.720)	0.607 (0.687)
Communist conflict	-0.415 (0.455)	-0.420 (0.448)	-0.514 (0.456)	-0.826* (0.475)	-0.760 (0.481)	-0.879* (0.476)
Terrorist conflict	-0.950* (0.555)	-0.862 (0.535)	-0.920* (0.554)	-0.649 (0.507)	-0.579 (0.506)	-0.621 (0.511)
Rebels stronger	.	0.755*** (0.253)	0.402 (0.348)	.	0.282 (0.273)	0.359 (0.427)
Rebels at parity	.	0.633*** (0.188)	0.585*** (0.186)	.	0.563*** (0.205)	0.595*** (0.206)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0215 (0.0325)	.	.	-0.0183 (0.0340)
Observations	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Controlling for Pro-Government Militias

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.107 (0.203)	-0.0765 (0.210)	-0.132 (0.209)	3.683*** (1.294)	3.879*** (1.397)	3.676*** (1.269)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.603*** (0.182)	-0.623*** (0.197)	-0.604*** (0.178)
Territorial control	-0.467*** (0.181)	-0.618*** (0.193)	-0.636*** (0.205)	-0.522*** (0.183)	-0.676*** (0.197)	-0.693*** (0.208)
Strong central command	0.264 (0.178)	.	0.254 (0.183)	0.207 (0.195)	.	0.168 (0.210)
High mobilization capacity	0.0235 (0.236)	.	0.101 (0.230)	-0.0365 (0.242)	.	0.0508 (0.243)
High arms-procurement capacity	1.026** (0.486)	.	0.907** (0.394)	1.245** (0.542)	.	1.190** (0.558)
High Fighting Capacity	0.225 (0.364)	.	0.132 (0.414)	-1.000 (0.880)	.	-1.459* (0.855)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.224 (0.146)	.	0.305* (0.157)
Legal political wing	0.472* (0.241)	0.493** (0.246)	0.525** (0.240)	0.493** (0.234)	0.509** (0.234)	0.557** (0.231)
Coup d'etat	2.727*** (0.321)	2.835*** (0.326)	2.805*** (0.326)	4.707*** (1.353)	4.359*** (1.197)	4.914*** (1.325)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.486** (0.218)	-0.410** (0.188)	-0.504** (0.211)
ELF index	0.401 (0.320)	0.394 (0.315)	0.367 (0.316)	0.542 (0.352)	0.587* (0.341)	0.455 (0.354)
Ethnic Conflict	0.214 (0.218)	0.249 (0.215)	0.243 (0.224)	4.483*** (1.061)	4.488*** (0.993)	4.587*** (1.055)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.647*** (0.148)	-0.643*** (0.139)	-0.664*** (0.151)
Ln GDP per capita	0.0502 (0.0993)	0.0651 (0.0975)	0.0669 (0.100)	0.0869 (0.103)	0.0634 (0.0957)	0.0981 (0.109)
Democracy	-1.042*** (0.275)	-1.112*** (0.278)	-1.105*** (0.281)	-0.818*** (0.274)	-0.846*** (0.271)	-0.861*** (0.289)
Two or more dyads	-0.347** (0.137)	-0.339** (0.138)	-0.298** (0.141)	-0.263 (0.703)	-0.218 (0.642)	-0.0313 (0.734)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.00296 (0.0982)	-0.00922 (0.0899)	-0.0274 (0.101)
Ln population	-0.140** (0.0582)	-0.114** (0.0573)	-0.120* (0.0664)	-0.180*** (0.0622)	-0.166*** (0.0606)	-0.180** (0.0797)
Pro-government militia	-0.179 (0.149)	-0.203 (0.151)	-0.210 (0.155)	-0.0889 (0.159)	-0.125 (0.157)	-0.0931 (0.165)
Rebels stronger	.	0.560** (0.282)	0.154 (0.383)	.	0.408 (0.319)	0.0681 (0.428)
Rebels at parity	.	0.905*** (0.199)	0.849*** (0.203)	.	0.796*** (0.244)	0.867*** (0.243)
Prior conflicts	.	.	0.00238 (0.0350)	.	.	0.0197 (0.0385)
Observations	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Matched Data

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-1.193*** (0.300)	-1.254*** (0.348)	-1.514*** (0.364)	7.522*** (2.613)	5.917** (2.889)	7.112** (2.804)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-1.194*** (0.355)	-0.987** (0.386)	-1.182*** (0.382)
Territorial control	-0.560** (0.269)	-0.876*** (0.268)	-0.687*** (0.224)	-0.714** (0.356)	-0.898*** (0.328)	-0.721** (0.319)
Strong central command	0.00648 (0.327)	.	0.0360 (0.345)	0.0514 (0.338)	.	0.0168 (0.363)
High mobilization capacity	0.202 (0.378)	.	0.153 (0.359)	0.179 (0.416)	.	0.255 (0.404)
High arms-procurement capacity	2.092** (0.974)	.	3.115*** (0.861)	2.910 (2.745)	.	4.790*** (1.649)
High Fighting Capacity	1.801** (0.775)	.	1.838*** (0.688)	-4.791 (11.20)	.	-10.48 (6.864)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.976 (1.522)	.	1.891* (0.997)
Legal political wing	1.702*** (0.500)	2.108*** (0.477)	1.956*** (0.631)	2.304*** (0.597)	2.034*** (0.524)	2.464*** (0.679)
War on core territory	-2.073*** (0.696)	-2.177*** (0.704)	-2.061** (0.803)	-2.425*** (0.784)	-2.078** (0.835)	-2.166** (0.944)
Coup d'etat	2.436*** (0.664)	2.392*** (0.627)	2.436*** (0.710)	3.517*** (0.855)	.	3.435*** (0.906)
ELF index	1.223* (0.657)	0.903 (0.673)	1.082 (0.699)	2.253*** (0.699)	1.275* (0.710)	2.134*** (0.750)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.460 (0.394)	-0.317 (0.366)	-0.398 (0.365)	7.164** (2.929)	-0.427 (0.416)	6.563** (3.068)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.969** (0.384)	.	-0.898** (0.404)
Ln GDP per capita	0.315** (0.156)	0.333** (0.165)	0.386** (0.153)	0.421** (0.169)	0.370** (0.173)	0.504*** (0.174)
Democracy	-1.531*** (0.518)	-1.704*** (0.549)	-1.695*** (0.583)	-1.243** (0.584)	-1.343** (0.608)	-1.371** (0.682)
Two or more dyads	0.142 (0.255)	0.210 (0.281)	0.335 (0.265)	6.191 (3.805)	2.712 (3.338)	6.876* (4.038)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	-0.817 (0.525)	-0.357 (0.451)	-0.888 (0.559)
Ln population	-0.0990 (0.130)	-0.0733 (0.145)	-0.0506 (0.124)	-0.241 (0.160)	-0.158 (0.170)	-0.185 (0.146)
Rebels stronger	.	0.309 (0.470)	-0.443 (0.450)	.	0.189 (0.536)	-0.782 (0.489)
Rebels at parity	.	1.673*** (0.454)	1.525*** (0.481)	.	1.617*** (0.468)	1.443*** (0.539)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0270 (0.0603)	.	.	-0.0208 (0.0709)
Observations	870	870	870	870	870	870

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Jin and Boehmke Adjustment

	No Ln Time Interactions			Ln Time Interactions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Conscription	-0.402** (0.165)	-0.359** (0.176)	-0.415** (0.173)	0.322 (0.298)	0.343 (0.303)	0.297 (0.305)
ConscriptXlnT	.	.	.	-0.134*** (0.0506)	-0.133** (0.0520)	-0.133*** (0.0518)
Territorial control	-0.348** (0.137)	-0.409*** (0.147)	-0.466*** (0.145)	-0.357*** (0.138)	-0.411*** (0.149)	-0.462*** (0.148)
Strong central command	0.295** (0.149)	.	0.299** (0.149)	0.248* (0.149)	.	0.256* (0.152)
High mobilization capacity	0.294 (0.185)	.	0.266 (0.180)	0.309* (0.177)	.	0.273 (0.174)
High arms-procurement capacity	0.458 (0.502)	.	0.357 (0.473)	0.445 (0.521)	.	0.366 (0.486)
High Fighting Capacity	0.505 (0.334)	.	0.128 (0.412)	0.153 (0.498)	.	-0.173 (0.509)
High fighting capXlnT	.	.	.	0.0653 (0.0751)	.	0.0606 (0.0756)
Legal political wing	0.599*** (0.180)	0.572*** (0.183)	0.598*** (0.180)	0.510*** (0.179)	0.474*** (0.183)	0.500*** (0.180)
War on core territory	-0.542* (0.285)	-0.607** (0.280)	-0.589** (0.290)	-0.597** (0.283)	-0.655** (0.279)	-0.642** (0.290)
Coup d'etat	2.075*** (0.339)	2.152*** (0.326)	2.081*** (0.327)	3.418*** (0.494)	3.362*** (0.491)	3.348*** (0.497)
CoupXlnT	.	.	.	-0.399*** (0.106)	-0.378*** (0.104)	-0.386*** (0.105)
ELF index	0.259 (0.300)	0.184 (0.299)	0.227 (0.299)	0.305 (0.286)	0.221 (0.280)	0.275 (0.288)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.0798 (0.175)	-0.0248 (0.171)	-0.0340 (0.176)	0.872** (0.444)	0.841* (0.442)	0.851* (0.442)
EthnicXlnT	.	.	.	-0.158** (0.0645)	-0.147** (0.0646)	-0.148** (0.0651)
Ln GDP per capita	0.122 (0.0795)	0.141* (0.0793)	0.122 (0.0815)	0.104 (0.0782)	0.120 (0.0779)	0.102 (0.0808)
Democracy	-0.855*** (0.191)	-0.880*** (0.198)	-0.868*** (0.195)	-0.861*** (0.184)	-0.878*** (0.191)	-0.875*** (0.190)
Two or more dyads	-0.425*** (0.125)	-0.416*** (0.128)	-0.399*** (0.127)	-1.271** (0.522)	-1.351*** (0.519)	-1.272** (0.519)
DyadsXlnT	.	.	.	0.130* (0.0751)	0.144* (0.0748)	0.134* (0.0747)
Ln population	-0.0617 (0.0535)	-0.0315 (0.0539)	-0.0264 (0.0601)	-0.0552 (0.0537)	-0.0293 (0.0537)	-0.0150 (0.0608)
Rebels stronger	.	0.919*** (0.275)	0.567 (0.366)	.	0.767*** (0.266)	0.500 (0.407)
Rebels at parity	.	0.596*** (0.186)	0.552*** (0.182)	.	0.512** (0.204)	0.472** (0.202)
Prior conflicts	.	.	-0.0163 (0.0303)	.	.	-0.0239 (0.0301)
Observations	53,608	53,608	53,608	53,608	53,608	53,608

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.14: Cox Estimates of Civil War Duration: Alternate Measures of Time

	Ln $\sqrt{\text{Time}}$, $\sqrt{\text{Time}}$, and Time Interactions								
Conscription	1.894*** (0.476)	1.860*** (0.515)	1.935*** (0.482)	0.950*** (0.258)	0.960*** (0.262)	0.948*** (0.261)	0.123 (0.187)	0.139 (0.191)	0.101 (0.194)
ConscriptXln \sqrt{T}	-0.771*** (0.140)	-0.766*** (0.149)	-0.794*** (0.140)
ConscriptX \sqrt{T}	.	.	.	-0.0453*** (0.00706)	-0.0456*** (0.00712)	-0.0464*** (0.00695)	.	.	.
ConscriptXT	-0.0004*** (8.74e-05)	-0.0004*** (8.88e-05)	-0.0004*** (8.58e-05)
Territorial control	-0.384*** (0.147)	-0.423*** (0.158)	-0.504*** (0.159)	-0.407*** (0.150)	-0.450*** (0.162)	-0.506*** (0.162)	-0.393*** (0.148)	-0.448*** (0.161)	-0.498*** (0.160)
Strong central command	0.308* (0.158)	.	0.303* (0.161)	0.272* (0.152)	.	0.275* (0.153)	0.255* (0.154)	.	0.262* (0.154)
High mobilization cap.	0.222 (0.173)	.	0.196 (0.171)	0.268 (0.177)	.	0.228 (0.175)	0.265 (0.186)	.	0.220 (0.183)
High arms-procurement cap.	0.616 (0.521)	.	0.574 (0.488)	0.471 (0.467)	.	0.397 (0.437)	0.425 (0.505)	.	0.339 (0.461)
High fighting capacity	-1.100* (0.573)	.	-1.451** (0.578)	-0.368 (0.491)	.	-0.623 (0.505)	0.0197 (0.463)	.	-0.252 (0.491)
High fighting capXln \sqrt{T}	0.546*** (0.165)	.	0.564*** (0.168)
High fighting capX \sqrt{T}	.	.	.	0.0371* (0.0190)	.	0.0345* (0.0194)	.	.	.
High fighting capXT	0.0007 (0.0006)	.	0.0005 (0.0005)
Legal political wing	0.497*** (0.183)	0.458** (0.182)	0.498*** (0.181)	0.436** (0.182)	0.395** (0.187)	0.420** (0.183)	0.447** (0.191)	0.413** (0.194)	0.439** (0.191)
War on core territory	-0.712*** (0.270)	-0.726*** (0.270)	-0.748*** (0.273)	-0.767*** (0.278)	-0.802*** (0.270)	-0.814*** (0.281)	-0.703** (0.282)	-0.744*** (0.272)	-0.752*** (0.289)
Coup d'etat	5.414*** (0.969)	5.021*** (0.960)	5.333*** (0.945)	3.857*** (0.446)	3.690*** (0.446)	3.776*** (0.449)	2.977*** (0.377)	2.912*** (0.375)	2.890*** (0.385)
CoupXln \sqrt{T}	-1.465*** (0.317)	-1.303*** (0.316)	-1.457*** (0.310)
CoupX \sqrt{T}	.	.	.	-0.135*** (0.0285)	-0.125*** (0.0256)	-0.134*** (0.0293)	.	.	.
CoupXT	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
ELF index	0.542* (0.313)	0.468 (0.310)	0.495 (0.317)	0.664** (0.321)	0.564* (0.311)	0.641** (0.327)	0.605* (0.309)	0.506* (0.294)	0.575* (0.317)
Ethnic conflict	4.824*** (0.882)	4.755*** (0.859)	4.744*** (0.868)	1.546*** (0.385)	1.526*** (0.379)	1.547*** (0.379)	0.422* (0.243)	0.436* (0.237)	0.456* (0.238)
EthnicXln \sqrt{T}	-1.492*** (0.248)	-1.463*** (0.243)	-1.456*** (0.247)
EthnicX \sqrt{T}	.	.	.	-0.0489*** (0.0105)	-0.0474*** (0.0103)	-0.0474*** (0.0105)	.	.	.
EthnicXT	-0.000334*** (9.45e-05)	-0.000321*** (9.36e-05)	-0.000319*** (9.32e-05)
Ln GDP per capita	0.156* (0.0832)	0.182** (0.0833)	0.158* (0.0858)	0.162* (0.0851)	0.180** (0.0837)	0.160* (0.0888)	0.149* (0.0856)	0.166** (0.0833)	0.147* (0.0890)
Democracy	-0.724*** (0.188)	-0.755*** (0.197)	-0.749*** (0.196)	-0.743*** (0.184)	-0.764*** (0.191)	-0.767*** (0.192)	-0.792*** (0.189)	-0.809*** (0.195)	-0.815*** (0.195)
Two or more dyads	0.607 (0.579)	0.423 (0.570)	0.596 (0.582)	-0.402 (0.346)	-0.445 (0.334)	-0.388 (0.344)	-0.620*** (0.200)	-0.617*** (0.197)	-0.595*** (0.203)
DyadsXln \sqrt{T}	-0.308* (0.167)	-0.248 (0.165)	-0.295* (0.168)
Dyads \sqrt{T}	.	.	.	-1.92e-05 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	0.0004 (0.009)	.	.	.
DyadsXT	0.0001 (8.99e-05)	0.0001 (8.75e-05)	0.0001 (8.83e-05)
Ln population	-0.0933* (0.0555)	-0.0786 (0.0559)	-0.0487 (0.0661)	-0.0990* (0.0573)	-0.0806 (0.0569)	-0.0471 (0.0675)	-0.0980* (0.0590)	-0.0753 (0.0584)	-0.0483 (0.0666)
Rebels stronger	.	0.322 (0.270)	0.413 (0.427)	.	0.535** (0.245)	0.409 (0.411)	.	0.661*** (0.236)	0.472 (0.393)
Rebels at parity	.	0.543*** (0.194)	0.563*** (0.197)	.	0.486** (0.210)	0.443** (0.211)	.	0.511** (0.207)	0.464** (0.204)
Prior Conflicts	.	.	-0.0275 (0.0321)	.	.	-0.0402 (0.0344)	.	.	-0.0383 (0.0331)
Observations	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415	2,415

Standard errors clustered on Conflict ID in parentheses; Ln corresponds to Natural Log

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.15: List of Post-Conflict Onset Conscription Adopters

Side A	Side B	Start Date	End/Censor Date	Conscription Adopted
Angola	FLEC	6/1/1991	12/31/2003	1992
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge/FUNK	5/1/1967	4/17/1975	1973
Ethiopia	TPLF	1/1/1976	5/28/1991	1977
Ethiopia	OLF	1/1/1976	5/28/1991	1977
Ethiopia	ELF	1/1/1962	12/31/1982	1977
Ethiopia	ELF Factions	1/1/1972	12/31/1982	1977
Ethiopia	EPLF	1/1/1972	5/28/1991	1977
Ethiopia	WSLF	9/1/1976	12/31/1983	1977
Laos	Pathet Lao	11/12/1959	2/22/1973	1964
Myanmar	KNU	2/1/1949	12/31/2003	1969
Myanmar	BCP	3/28/1948	9/18/1988	1969
Myanmar	Communist Party of Arakan	3/11/1962	12/31/1980	1969
Myanmar	NMSP	12/31/1958	12/31/1990	1969
Myanmar	KIO	1/1/1961	12/1/1992	1969
Myanmar	SSA	1/1/1960	12/31/1970	1969
Myanmar	SNLPO	1/1/1967	12/31/1988	1969
Nicaragua	Contras	12/31/1981	10/15/1989	1982
Somalia	SSDF	1/1/1980	12/31/1991	1983
Somalia	SNM	1/1/1982	12/31/1991	1983
Sudan	SPLM	5/17/1983	12/31/2003	1989

Figure A.1: Love Plot for Matched and All (i.e., Un-Matched) Data

