Supplemental Appendix

The Baseline Inflated Multinomial Logit Model for International Relations Research

In this supplemental appendix I first describe the operationalizations and sources for the variables used in the Buhaug (2006) and Huth and Allee (2002) replications. I next define and report a collection of odds ratios for my BIMNL and MNL models, and for my two primary applications specifically. Finally, I present and discuss a series of robustness models and tables that make use of alternative covariate specifications for each application.

1. Variable Operationalizations

In this section, I first present the variable operationalizations used in my primary (and robustness) replications of Huth and Allee (2002), and then list the variable operationalizations for my replications of Buhaug (2006). For each application, this section also presents frequency distributions of my primary dependent variables (*Challenger action* and *Multinomial rebelion*) in Figures A.1 and A.2.

Variable operationalizations for the Huth and Allee (2002) replication are as follows:

- *Challenger action*: the dependent variable in the Huth and Allee (2002) replication. This variable captures the decision made by a challenger state with respect to a particular territorial dispute, and can take on three values: 0 for no action, 1 for a call for negotiations, and 2 for an initiation of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). A frequency distribution for this variable is presented in Figure A.1.

- *Challenger democracy level*: An ordinal variable ranging from -10 to 10, where higher values correspond to more democratic countries, and where the values correspond to the Polity 2 score of the challenger state in year t, taken from the Polity IV project (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1989) and Huth and Allee (2002)

- *Stalemate*: Coded 1 if there was a stalemated round of talks over a given territorial dispute within the past year, and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Challenger Democracy × Stalemate*: the interaction between *challenger democracy level* and *stalemate*

- *Ethnic ties*: Coded 1 if the challenger had ethnic co-nationals in the disputed territory, and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Challenger Democracy × Ethnic Ties*: the interaction between *challenger democracy level* and *ethnic ties*

- *Democratic dyads*: Coded 1 for challenger-target democratic dyads (based on Polity 2), and 0 otherwise (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1989; Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Mixed dyad*: Coded 1 for challenger-target mixed dyads (based on Polity 2), and 0 otherwise (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1989; Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Non-Democratic State in mixed dyad*: Coded 1 if the challenger is the non-democratic state within a mixed dyad, and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Common security ties*: Coded 1 when challengers and targets hold common security (alliance) ties, and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Strategic value of territory*: Coded 1 for disputed territories that hold strategic military value (due to location or natural resources that were perceived as valuable to military weapons production), and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Challenger involved in other dispute*: Coded 1 if the challenger was involved in a separate MID in year t (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996), and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Target involved in other dispute*: Coded 1 if the target was involved in a separate MID in year t (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996), and 0 otherwise (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Military balance*: As described in Huth and Allee (2002, 786), "the ratio of military capabilities between each state and its adversary and ranges along a continuous scale from 0 to 1. The measure is an average ratio of three separate indicators of military capabilities: (1) total military personnel, (2) military expenditures, and (3) expenditures per soldier. The primary source for data on these indicators is the Correlates of War (COW) data set on national capabilities (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996)."

- *Months since last challenge*: The number of months since the occurrence of previous activity (talks or MID) with respect to a given territorial dispute (Huth and Allee, 2002)

- *Contiguity*: Coded 1 if challenger and target state involved in a territorial dispute shared direct contiguity, and 0 otherwise (Stinnett et al., 2002)

- *Ordinal contiguity*: For challenger and target, coded 0 if non-contiguous, 1 if separated by 400 miles of water or less (but more than 150 miles), 2 if separated by 150 miles of water or less (but more than 24 miles), 3 if separated by 24 miles of water or less (but more than 12 miles), 4 if separated by 12 miles of water or less, and 5 if separated by only a land or river border (Stinnett et al., 2002).

- *Major power*: Coded 1 if challenger was a major power in year t, and 0 otherwise (COW, 2008)

Figure A.1: Distribution of Outcomes for *Challenger action*

Variable operationalizations for the Buhaug (2006) replication are as follows:

- *Multinomial rebelion*: coded from Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, v. 3.0 (Gleditsch et al., 2002), includes every violent conflict outbreak between governments and opposition groups that resulted in at least 25 annual battle deaths between 1946 and 2004, classifying each conflict as governmental ($= 2$) or territorial ($= 1$). A frequency distribution for this variable is presented in Figure A.2.

- *Polity$_{t-1}$*: democracy-autocracy index taken from Polity IV project (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1989), ranging from -10 to 10 (Buhaug, 2006)

- *Democracy$_{t-1}$*: dichotomous, equal to 1 for countries with values of policy greater or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise (Buhaug, 2006)

- *Anocracy$_{t-1}$*: dichotomous, equal to 1 for countries with values of policy ranging between -5-to-5, and 0 otherwise (Buhaug, 2006)

- *GDP per capita$_{t-1}$*: GDP per capita income, lagged one year, taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Figure A.2: Distribution of Outcomes for *Multinomial rebelion*

- *Oil exporter$_{t-1}$*: Dichotomous, equal to one for countries in which fuel exports exceeded one-third of total revenue, from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

- *Country size*: the logged geographical area of a country (World Bank, 2002)

- *Ethnic fractionalization*: Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index (ELF), with values ranging from 0 to 1, and denoting the probability that two randomly drawn persons in a country belong to different ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

- *Conflict/independence decay function*: halflife parameter denoting the time since previous civil war or country-independence (Buhaug, 2006)

- *Former colony*: binary variable equal to 1 if a country was coded as being a (former) Western overseas colony, and 0 if a country was coded as never being colonized by a Western overseas colonizer, drawn from Hadenius and Teorell (2005)

4

2. Odds Ratios

The outcome stage estimates for the BIMNL model are conditionally distributed MNL (Bagozzi and Marchetti, 2013). Hence the BIMNL's outcome stage coefficient estimates, like those of the MNL, can be thought of as arising from a log-odds model, where the log of the ratio of two outcome stage probabilities is a function of one's explanatory variables:

$$\ln\left[\frac{\Pr(Y_i = j|\mathbf{x})}{\Pr(Y_i = j'|\mathbf{x})}\right] = \mathbf{x}(\hat{\beta}_j - \hat{\beta}_{j'}). \tag{S.A.1}$$

As is the case for relative risk ratios in the MNL context, the final quantity $(\mathbf{x}(\hat{\beta}_j - \hat{\beta}_{j'}))$ further simplifies to $\mathbf{x}\hat{\beta}_j$ upon constraining the coefficients of one category (i.e., $\hat{\beta}_{j'}$) to zero. This implies that one can recover the change in the odds ratio for category j (*relative to the baseline category*) associated with a one unit change in a given variable $\mathbf{x_k}$ by calculating $\exp(\hat{\beta}_{jk})$.[1] Similarly, because the BIMNL's inflation stage estimates arise from the logistic c.d.f, $\exp(\hat{\gamma}_k)$ returns the change in the odds of $\Pr(\text{Non-Inflation})$ associated with a one-unit increase in $\mathbf{z_k}$. Hence, tables of exponentiated (inflation and outcomes stage) BIMNL coefficient estimates provide a more interpretable set of quantities (relative to raw coefficient estimates) as (i) the outcome stage odds ratio quantities communicate the change in the odds of seeing outcome j relative to the baseline category given a one unit change in each covariate (conditional on an observation being non-inflated) and (ii) the inflation stage odds ratio quantities communicate the change in the relative odds of non-inflation given a one unit change in a given inflation stage covariate. In Tables A.1-A.2 below, I report these MNL and BIMNL odds ratios, along with their 95% confidence intervals, for each of the two applications reported in the main paper.

3. Robustness Models

This section discusses a series of robustness models for my Huth and Allee (2002) and Buhaug (2006) replications. Beginning with the robustness models for the Huth and Allee

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[1]Where importantly, and akin to one's BIMNL coefficient estimates, the interpretation of these ratios remains conditional on an observation being a fully non-inflated case.

Table A.1: Odds Ratios for BIMNL and MNL Models of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo

	MNL		BIMNL		
	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Pr(Non-Inflation)
Challenger democracy level	1.018	0.947	0.962	0.893	1.013
	(1.007 ↔ 1.030)	(0.922 ↔ 0.927)	(0.873 ↔ 1.061)	(0.808 ↔ 0.987)	(0.998 ↔ 1.028)
Challenger Democracy × Stalemate	0.997	0.986	1.069	1.053	0.981
	(0.978 ↔ 1.016)	(0.950 ↔ 1.023)	(0.982 ↔ 1.164)	(0.962 ↔ 1.152)	(0.958 ↔ 1.006)
Recent stalemate	1.567	1.393	0.465	0.496	1.851
	(1.231 ↔ 1.994)	(0.932 ↔ 2.082)	(0.126 ↔ 1.721)	(0.131 ↔ 1.882)	(1.345 ↔ 2.548)
Challenger Democracy × Ethnic Ties	1.015	1.051	1.004	1.041	1.036
	(0.999 ↔ 1.032)	(1.018 ↔ 1.086)	(0.919 ↔ 1.098)	(0.949 ↔ 1.142)	(1.014 ↔ 1.059)
Ethnic ties	1.150	1.287	0.233	0.270	1.315
	(0.949 ↔ 1.393)	(0.919 ↔ 1.804)	(0.045 ↔ 1.202)	(0.051 ↔ 1.416)	(1.007 ↔ 1.719)
Common security ties	0.949	0.655	1.020	0.714	0.830
	(0.838 ↔ 1.076)	(0.512 ↔ 0.838)	(0.541 ↔ 1.923)	(0.365 ↔ 1.395)	(0.705 ↔ 0.978)
Strategic value	1.220	1.464	5.113	5.900	
	(1.068 ↔ 1.394)	(1.156 ↔ 1.853)	(1.214 ↔ 21.524)	(1.382 ↔ 25.185)	
Challenger in other dispute	0.904	1.635	1.011	1.918	
	(0.780 ↔ 1.047)	(1.281 ↔ 2.087)	(0.580 ↔ 1.765)	(1.069 ↔ 3.441)	
Target in other dispute	0.984	1.405	2.048	2.768	
	(0.861 ↔ 1.214)	(1.101 ↔ 1.792)	(0.625↔ 6.715)	(0.836↔ 9.166)	
Military balance	0.968	4.213	0.019	0.090	2.292
	(0.772↔1.214)	(2.793 ↔ 6.357)	(0.003 ↔ 0.112)	(0.015↔0.546)	(1.328 ↔ 3.956)
Months since last challenge	0.994	0.984	1.000	0.993	0.993
	(0.993 ↔ 0.995)	(0.981 ↔ 0.988)	(0.997 ↔ 1.003)	(0.989 ↔ 0.998)	(0.992 ↔ 0.994)
Contiguity					0.962
					(0.832 ↔ 1.112)
Major power					1.281
					(1.040 ↔ 1.578)

Notes: $N = 6,544$. Reported quantities are odds ratios, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.

Table A.2: Odds Ratios for BIMNL and MNL Models of Rebellion

	MNL		BIMNL		
	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Pr(Non-Inflation)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	2.449	0.876	1.993	0.626	
	(1.329↔4.512)	(0.498↔1.541)	(0.814 ↔ 4.879)	(0.218↔1.795)	
Anocracy$_{t-1}$	1.256	1.764	1.140	1.424	
	(0.697↔2.261)	(1.178↔2.642)	(0.530 ↔ 2.454)	(0.697 ↔ 2.910)	
GDP Per Capita$_{t-1}$	0.846	0.854	0.782	0.760	1.402
	(0.747 ↔ 0.956)	(0.774 ↔ 0.942)	(0.671↔0.911)	(0.656 ↔ 0.882)	(1.048 ↔ 1.876)
Oil Exporter	1.795	2.311	5.173	8.936	0.085
	(0.957 ↔ 3.367)	(1.441 ↔ 3.707)	(1.523 ↔ 17.542)	(2.569 ↔ 31.090)	(0.009↔ 0.810)
Country Size (log)	1.638	1.036	1.654	1.047	
	(1.380 ↔ 1.944)	(0.921 ↔ 1.166)	(1.391 ↔ 1.968)	(0.929 ↔ 1.181)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	4.786	1.698	5.483	1.776	
	(1.851 ↔ 12.374)	(0.875 ↔ 3.295)	(2.042 ↔ 14.725)	(0.885↔3.565)	
Decay Function	23.778	2.435	12.693	1.119	14.307
	(12.790↔44.207)	(1.378↔ 4.305)	(5.003↔32.203)	(0.407↔3.082)	(3.077 ↔ 66.519)
Polity$_{t-1}$					1.099
					(0.967 ↔ 1.259)

Notes: $N = 5,411$. Reported quantities are odds ratios, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.

(2002) replication, I present two such models. First, recall that the replication models presented in the main paper for the Huth and Allee (2002) application are but one of a number of model specifications presented in Huth and Allee (2002)—specifically the authors' "Political Accountability Model—Comparing Differences across Regimes" (Huth and Allee, 2002, Table 1). I therefore replicate a second model specification used by the authors—"Political Accountability Model—Comparing Differences across Dyads" (Huth and Allee, 2002, Table 3)—to demonstrate the robustness of the BIMNL model both generally and with respect to a number of the Huth and Allee (2002) replication's inflation and outcome stage coefficient estimates more specifically.

This replication is presented in Table A.3, and is fairly consistent with the primary BIMNL model reported in the main paper. For instance, examining the BIMNL inflation stage results in Table A.3, one can again note that increases in *common security ties* and *months since last challenge* each make challengers significantly less likely to be able to challenge the status quo via any means. Next, *military balance* (in favor of the challenger) and *major power* are each again positively associated with the probability of non-inflation, in that the BIMNL inflation stage suggests that each covariate makes a challenger more capable of challenging the status quo in some manner— though *contiguity* continues to have no significant effect in this stage. Finally, *democratic* and *mixed* dyads appear to each be more able to initiate some challenge to the status quo, relative to autocratic dyads, which is consistent with the *challenger democracy level* inflation-stage findings in the main paper. Hence, as a whole, the BIMNL inflation stage estimates for this application appear relatively stable.

Turning to the BIMNL and MNL outcome stage coefficient estimates reported in Table A.3, the BIMNL estimates for the various *democracy* and *mixed* dyad measures appear to no longer exhibit consistent significant effects on territorial talks or MIDs, in contrast to the MNL model estimates. A key exception to this appears to be *democratic dyads'* significant negative effect on the use of force (relative to status quo) across both the MNL and BIMNL models in Table A.3. These divergences and similarities between the BIMNL and MNL models parallel the findings

for *challenge democracy level* in the main paper to a large degree. Turning back to Table A.3, many of Huth and Allee's MNL outcome stage controls become insignificant when re-estimated with the BIMNL model, including target/challeger involvement in other disputes and *strategic value*, which is in contrast to the primary BIMNL model reported in the main paper. Finally, and as was the case for the main paper's BIMNL model, *military balance* becomes a significant negative predictor of both outcomes in the BIMNL model, in contrast to its MNL estimates. In sum, the outcome and inflation stage results reported for the BIMNL model in Table A.3 reinforce the findings reported in the main paper, in that ignoring baseline category inflation appears to yield biased and inefficient MNL coefficient estimates. Further, the present BIMNL model also reinforces the general stability and robustness of the BIMNL model for this particular application, as the inflation and outcome stage of the BIMNL discussed here are largely comparable to those discussed in the main paper.

Next, I return to my primary replication model for this application (i.e., "Political Accountability Model—Comparing Differences across Regimes" (Huth and Allee, 2002, Table 1)) and re-estimate this model with a different inflation stage measure of contiguity, specifically an *ordinal contiguity* measure (operationalized above). Recall that the binary inflation stage *contiguity* measure failed to achieve significance in my main paper's analysis. This is somewhat surprising[2] as past studies of inflation processes in interstate conflict have found non-contiguity to induce an inflation-like effect among peace-observations (Xiang, 2010; Bagozzi et al., 2014). Thus, the inclusion of an alternate contiguity measure both allows me to further test for the potential inflation-inducing effects of (non)-contiguity on conflict and talks, as well as to further demonstrate that my main replication model's results are generally robust to alternate inflation stage specifications. Doing so in Table A.4 below, I find that (i) *ordinal contiguity* is again insignificant and (ii) virtually all of the inflation and outcome stage estimates remain unchanged relative to the primary replication model reported in the main paper. Hence, contiguity does not appear to have an inflation inducing effect on *challenger actions* with respect to territorial dis-

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[2]It may be the case that contiguity *only* exerts such an inflation-inducing effect on MIDs (vs. "peace"), in which case the *contiguity* variable included here would have less of an inflation-inducing effect, as "talks," a more cooperative outcome, is also modeled with the BIMNL model's outcome stage.

Table A.3: BIMNL and MNL Models of Challenger Decisions to Contest the Territorial Status Quo: Political Accountability Model—Comparing Differences Across Dyads

	MNL		BIMNL		
	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Pr(Non--Inflation)
Constant	-0.562***	-2.369***	4.153***	2.308**	-0.490***
	(0.079)	(0.150)	(1.076)	(1.080)	(0.105)
Democratic Dyads	0.480***	-0.883***	-0.874	-2.312***	0.471***
	(0.094)	(0.245)	(0.647)	(0.683)	(0.135)
Non-Democratic State in mixed dyad	-0.304***	0.425**	0.320	0.971	-0.298*
	(0.104)	(0.207)	(1.207)	(1.209)	(0.159)
Mixed dyad	0.321***	-0.473**	-0.334	-1.134*	0.384***
	(0.093)	(0.184)	(0.618)	(0.633)	(0.145)
Common security ties	-0.106*	-0.540***	0.119	-0.287	-0.225***
	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.492)	(0.507)	(0.083)
Strategic value of territory	0.164**	0.335***	3.077	3.241	
	(0.067)	(0.119)	(3.342)	(3.343)	
Challenger in other dispute	-0.111	0.471***	-0.207	0.418	
	(0.075)	(0.124)	(0.338)	(0.353)	
Target in other dispute	-0.037	0.379***	0.299	0.681	
	(0.068)	(0.126)	(0.647)	(0.654)	
Military balance	-0.089	1.242***	-3.899***	-2.609**	0.491**
	(0.124)	(0.218)	(1.242)	(1.249)	(0.213)
Months since last challenge	-0.007***	-0.017***	-0.001	-0.005**	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Contiguity					0.100
					(0.079)
Major power					0.220**
					(0.105)

Notes: $N = 6,544$. Standard error in parentheses *** indicates $p < .01$; ** indicates $p < .05$; * indicates $p < .10$

putes, though the BIMNL model continues to do an exemplary job in modeling this dependent variable overall.

I next present a pair of robustness models for the Buhaug (2006) replication, so as to further demonstrate the stability of the BIMNL model and its estimates in this particular application. The first robustness model replicates the primary MNL and BIMNL models presented in my main paper, while including a more limited number of variables within the inflation stage. Turning to this smaller BIMNL specification (Table A.5)—which now omits *Oil exporter$_{t-1}$* from the inflation stage—one can note a number of similarities and differences. For instance, *GDP Per Capita$_{t-1}$* continues to exert a positive effect on each type of rebellion, but is no longer a statistically significant predictor of inflation. On the other hand, *country Size (log)* and *Ethnic Fractionalization* exhibit comparable effects to those reported in the main paper's BIMNL

Table A.4: BIMNL and MNL Models of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo: Political Accountability Model—Comparing Differences Across Regimes (Ordinal Contiguity Measure)

| | MNL | | BIMNL | | |
	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Talks vs. No Action	Force vs. No Action	Pr(Non--Inflation)
Constant	-0.743***	-3.209***	4.198***	1.566	-0.748***
	(0.082)	(0.179)	(0.967)	(0.971)	(0.096)
Challenger democracy level	0.018***	-0.055***	-0.0478	-0.122*	0.014*
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.008)
Challenger Democracy × Stalemate	-0.003	-0.014	0.070	0.055	-0.019
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.013)
Recent stalemate	0.449***	0.332	-0.829	-0.764	0.612***
	(0.123)	(0.205)	(0.717)	(0.729)	(0.164)
Challenger Democracy × Ethnic Ties	0.015*	0.050***	0.005	0.041	0.035***
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.012)
Ethnic ties	0.140	0.253	-1.570	-1.423	0.259*
	(0.098)	(0.172)	(1.044)	(1.051)	(0.139)
Common security ties	-0.052	-0.423***	0.100	-0.255	-0.181**
	(0.064)	(0.126)	(0.374)	(0.392)	(0.085)
Strategic value of territory	0.199***	0.381***	1.714**	1.859**	
	(0.068)	(0.120)	(0.834)	(0.840)	
Challenger in other dispute	-0.101	0.492***	0.075	0.712**	
	(0.075)	(0.125)	(0.331)	(0.342)	
Target in other dispute	-0.016	0.340***	0.808	1.109	
	(0.068)	(0.124)	(0.732)	(0.736)	
Military balance	-0.032	1.438***	-3.585***	-2.027**	0.647**
	(0.116)	(0.210)	(1.018)	(1.024)	(0.287)
Months since last challenge	-0.006***	-0.016***	0.000	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ordinal contiguity					0.017
					(0.016)
Major power					0.265**
					(0.106)

Notes: $N = 6,544$. Standard error in parentheses ** indicates $p < .01$; * indicates $p < .05$

model. Examining the inflation stage more closely, *Decay Function* remains a significant positive predictor of inflation, whereas *Polity$_{t-1}$* is now also a significant positive predictor of inflation, suggesting that more democratic countries are more likely to be able to experience some degree of civil conflict. Finally, and perhaps as consequence of this latter effect, *democracy* is now a significant negative predictor of governmental rebellion (relative to peace), once one has conditioned on a country's baseline ability to experience any degree of rebellion. In sum, the similarities and differences exhibited for this comparison suggest that the Buhaug (2006) replication's BIMNL results are somewhat sensitive to inflation stage specification, which is

consistent with the mixed model fit statistic-results that I find for the BIMNL model in this application in the main paper.

To further examine these conclusions, I re-estimate my primary Buhaug (2006) replication models, this time with a *larger* BIMNL inflation stage specification than that which was used in the main paper's BIMNL replication. Specifically, I add a dichotomous *former colony* variable (operationalized above) to my inflation stage to further identify this stage. Former colonies (especially when compared with most advanced developed democracies) may possess poorer institutions, higher levels of poverty, and lower overall state capacity which may make such countries comparatively more able to experience civil war of any kind, though it is unlikely that this factor alone directly causes either territorial or governmental rebellion against domestic governments. Table A.6 reports these results. First examining the BIMNL model's outcome stage in Table A.6, all outcome stage results in this case are comparable to the main paper's BIMNL model in signs and statistical significance-levels. The same can be said of the inflation stage covariates, with the exception of $Polity_{t-1}$ which is now marginally significant and positive in Table A.6 (implying that increases in democracy makes a country more able to experience civil war). Similarly, *former colony* is positive and marginally significant in Table A.6's inflation stage, intuitively implying that former colonies are more predisposed to have some form of civil war than are non-colonies. Taken together, these results suggest that the above conclusions with respect to the non-robustness of this particular BIMNL model application may have been overstated, as in the case of this larger robustness model, the BIMNL's results are near identical to those reported in the main paper.

11

Table A.5: BIMNL and MNL Models of Rebellion (Smaller Specification)

| | MNL | | BIMNL | | |
	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Pr(Non--Inflation)
Constant	-12.480***	-4.404***	-9.897***	-1.522	-2.619***
	(1.188)	(0.760)	(1.550)	(1.116)	(0.544)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.896***	-0.133	-0.409	-1.504**	
	(0.312)	(0.288)	(0.634)	(0.629)	
Anocracy$_{t-1}$	0.228	0.568***	-0.365	-0.150	
	(0.300)	(0.206)	(0.545)	(0.487)	
GDP Per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.167**	-0.158***	-0.308***	-0.335***	0.068
	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.109)
Oil Exporter	0.585*	0.838***	1.440	1.957*	
	(0.321)	(0241)	(0.905)	(1.005)	
Country Size (log)	0.493***	0.035	0.584***	0.120	
	(0.087)	(0.060)	(0.127)	(0.109)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.566***	0.539	2.254***	1.012*	
	(0.485)	(0.338)	(0.765)	(0.608)	
Decay Function	3.169***	0.890***	0.732	-1.618*	2.581***
	(0.316)	(0.291)	(0.973)	(0.963)	(0.416)
Polity$_{t-1}$					0.076**
					(0.033)

Notes: $N = 5,411$. Standard error in parentheses *** indicates $p < .01$; ** indicates $p < .05$; * indicates $p < .10$

Table A.6: BIMNL and MNL Models of Rebellion (Larger Specification)

| | MNL | | BIMNL | | |
	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Territorial vs. Status quo	Governmental vs. Status quo	Pr(Non--Inflation)
Constant	-12.480***	-4.404***	-11.866***	-3.478***	-0.801
	(1.188)	(0.760)	(1.290)	(0.954)	(0.792)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.896***	-0.133	0.515	-0.682	
	(0.312)	(0.288)	(0.438)	(0.493)	
Anocracy$_{t-1}$	0.228	0.568***	0.006	0.197	
	(0.300)	(0.206)	(0.387)	(0.346)	
GDP Per Capita$_{t-1}$	-0.167**	-0.158***	-0.248***	-0.281***	0.382**
	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.079)	(0.078)	0.150
Oil Exporter	0.585*	0.838***	1.529**	2.008***	-2.122***
	(0.321)	(0241)	(0.618)	(0.636)	(0.914)
Country Size (log)	0.493***	0.035	0.521***	0.057	
	(0.087)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.062)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.566***	0.539	1.659***	0.536	
	(0.485)	(0.338)	(0.508)	(0.358)	
Decay Function	3.169***	0.890***	2.424***	-0.006	2.817***
	(0.316)	(0.291)	(0.460)	(0.497)	(0.764)
Polity$_{t-1}$					0.109*
					(0.065)
Former Colony					0.778*
					(0.424)

Notes: $N = 5,411$. Standard error in parentheses *** indicates $p < .01$; ** indicates $p < .05$; * indicates $p < .10$

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